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CASE COMMENTS
little hope of recovery, its profits will not be increased. If the
creditor does not want the debtor to be sued, this can be ar-
ranged when the initial agreement is made.
The courts erred when they relied upon the age-old cliche
that what you may not do directly, you may not do indirectly.44
In the context of the lay intermediary, the practice of hiring
an attorney eliminates the objections underlying the direct prac-
tice of law. 45 When an attorney is hired to do the legal work,
regardless of who hires him, he is subject to the same restric-
tions as other attorneys and has met the qualifications to entitle
him to practice law.
The court's objections to collection agencies acting as inter-
mediaries in hiring attorneys and controlling legal proceedings
seem somewhat superficial in view of the demand for such
services and the relatively minor dangers involved. Where there
is a conflict of interest between the creditor and the collection
agency, it should be treated as such, and barring such activities
as the unauthorized practice of law should be done only after
consideration of the desires and interests of the creditors who
are presumably the ones being protected.
Libel: Times Rule Held Applicable to Plaintiff
Who Was Both Public Official and Public Figure
at Different Times During the Libel
Plaintiff was awarded general and punitive damages in a
libel action which arose out of published statements to the effect
that he was a collaborator or sympathizer with Communists.
These libelous statements were published and distributed over
several years.' During the initial libels the plaintiff was either
Commercial Law Leagues, supra note 14, at 208. Actually, less than 5%
are ever sent to attorneys. Brief Sur Draft 156. Given the small
percentage of accounts sent to attorneys, and the fee based on recovery,
it is unlikely there will be substantial conflict of interests.
44. See Comment, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 572, 576 (1957).
45. See note 6 supra. The dangers specified for the direct practice
of law by laymen are obviated if an attorney is doing the legal work.
1. The plaintiff, Dr. Arnold Rose, had participated in the writing
of the monumental book discussing the problems of Negroes in this
country entitled An American Dilemma (1944). The defendant alleged
that the book had been written in large part by Communists and Com-
munist fronters, and concluded that Rose's participation in the writing
of the book marked him as a Communist collaborator. These libelous
1968] 1307
MINNESOTA LAW7 REVIEW
a candidate for election or an elected state representative; 2
subsequent to his legislative term, he was a prominent, although
nonofficial, public figure.3 The trial court correctly instructed
the jury that the libelous statements published while the plain-
tiff was a candidate or elected representative were actionable
only if made with actual malice. However, the court further
instructed that the plaintiff need not prove actual malice in
order to recover damages for the statements published or dis-
tributed during the period that he was a nonofficial public figure.
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded
for a new trial, holding that since the plaintiff was either a
public official or a public figure at all times, he could not re-
cover damages in libel for any period absent a constitutionally
sufficient showing of actual malice. Rose v. Koch, 154 N.W.2d
409 (Minn. 1967).
In order to encourage uninhibited discussion of public issues
and public figures, the United States Supreme Court has recently
expanded the conditional privilege of comment on public officials
and public figures. 4 The landmark case of New York Times Com-
pany v. Sullivan,5 decided in 1964, established the rule that a pub-
lic official could not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
statements were published during the fal of 1962 and spring of 1963
in the defendant's right wing newspaper, Facts for Action. The d-e-
fendant distributed these newspapers before, during, and after the
plaintiff's legislative term.
2. The plaintiff was a representative in the state legislature from
January, 1963, to December 31, 1964, and a candidate for election for
some months prior to his legislative term. Rose v. Koch, 154 N.W.2d
409, 413 (Minn. 1967).
3. The Minnesota court characterized Dr. Rose as a "person of
prominence and public importance in this state and, indeed, nationally
and even internationally." 154 N.W.2d at 413. Dr. Rose was a pro-
fessor of Sociology at the University of Minnesota. He had lectured
widely on the subject of public attitudes toward Communism, and had
served on the President's National Advisory Committee on Housing for
Senior Citizens. See generally A. RosE, LIBEL AND ACADEvnc FREEDOm
(1968) (this book was written by the plaintiff in the instant case and
describes his law suit in detail).
4. These changes in the law of libel have evoked a great deal of
commentary. See, e.g., A. RosE, supra note 3, at 118-21; Kalven, The
New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning" of the First
Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Kalven, The Reasonable Man
and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUiP. CT.
REv. 267; Meildejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO.
L.J. 234 (1966); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel:
The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CoRnLL L.Q. 581 (1964); Note,
Defamation of the Public Official, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 614 (1966); Comment,
Libel of the Public Figure: An Unsettled Controversy, 12 ST. Louis
U.L. REv. 103 (1967); Comment, 32 ALBANY L. REv. 207 (1967).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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concerning his official conduct "unless he proves that the state-
ment was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."" The plaintiff in the Times case was the elected
police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama; the falsehood re-
lated to his handling of a student civil rights demonstration
and his treatment of Dr. Martin Luther King. Since the plaintiff
was clearly a public official and the libel clearly concerned his
official conduct, the Times Court was able to reserve judgment
as to the ultimate scope of the terms "public official" and
"official conduct."7
Definition of these terms became necessary in Rosen-
blatt v. Baers and Garrison v. Louisiana.9 In Rosenblatt, where
a former nonelected supervisor of a county recreation area was
held to be a public official, the Court defined public officials to
include at least those "government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs."'10 In Garri-
son, the Court broadly defined the official conduct concept by
including therein "anything which might touch on an official's
fitness for office.""
A frequently raised question at this time was whether the
similarities between public officials and public figures made
necessary the application of the Times rule to the latter. 2 This
question was finally reached by the Court in two cases, decided
together in June of 1967. In Associated Press v. Walker,13 the
plaintiff was a politically prominent person and a well-known
former Army general, and in Curtis Publishing Company v.
Butts, 4 the plaintiff was the athletic director and former foot-
6. Id. at 279-80.
7. Id. at 283 n.23.
8. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
9. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
10. 383 U.S. at 85.
11. 379 U.S. at 77. The defendant in Garrison had accused several
state court judges of laziness and inefficiency and had implied that
they were under racketeer influences.
12. Lower federal and state courts often faced this question after
Times and resolved it both ways. See, e.g., Pauling v. News Syndicate
Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965) (Times
rule held applicable to a famous scientist); Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 14
N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372, 253 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
916 (1965) (Times rule held not applicable to a radio and television
performer).
13. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
14. Id.
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ball coach at the University of Georgia. Although the seven
members of the Court that reached the question agreed that both
men were public figures,15 there was a three-way split as to the
applicable standard. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices
Brennan and White, would hold the Times standard of ac-
tual malice applicable equally to public officials and public
figures. 16 Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and
Fortas, would apply a less strict standard to public figures and
permit recovery on a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investi-
gation and reporting ordinarily adhered to be responsible pub-
lishers. 17 Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, would hold
any libel judgment an infringement of the first amendment
and therefore unconstitutional.' 8 Chief Justice Warren pre-
vailed in Walker'9 and the plaintiff's judgment in that case
was reversed.20 In Butts, however, the plaintiff's judgment was
affirmed with Justice Harlan's new public figure standard pre-
15. Id. at 162.
16. In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice noted that the
consolidation and blending of powers in both the governmental and
private spheres had given nonofficial public figures great control over
the resolution of important public questions. Furthermore, he thought it
clear that such men have as ready access to the means of publicity as do
public officials, and can as well use this publicity to influence policy or
rebut criticism. Id. at 162.
17. Id. at 155.
18. Id. at 172. Justice Black has consistently maintained this
absolutist position. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) (con-
curring and dissenting opinion); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 293 (1964) (concurring opinion). See generally Cohn, Justice Black
and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 549 (1962).
19. Justices Black and Douglas joined in the Chief Justice's opin-
ion in Walker, but only to enable the Court to reach a majority ground
of decision in that case. In Butts, they dissented on the ground that
any libel judgment is unconstitutional. See note 18 supra.
20. The libel in Walker arose out of the Associated Press' mis-
statement of Walker's participation in the 1962 race riots at the Uni-
versity of Mississippi. The news dispatch stated that Walker had led a
charge against the federal marshals and had encouraged the use of
violence. Walker contended that he had only advocated peaceful pro-
test and had at no time taken control of the crowd.
The Chief Justice held without elaboration that the judgment
for Walker was in clear conflict with the Times case. Justice Harlan,
after a lengthy analysis of the evidence, agreed that Walker's judg-
ment must be reversed on the basis of his new standard for public
figures. In finding a lack of "highly unreasonable conduct" on the
part of Associated Press, Justice Harlan noted that the news dispatch
required immediate dissemination, and that the AP had received its
information from an on-the-scene correspondent and had no reason to
doubt its trustworthiness.
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vailing as the plurality opinion.21
The Minnesota court in Rose resolved two threshold ques-
tions by finding that the defendant's statements were libel-
ous, 22 and by finding that the plaintiff was a public figure subse-
quent to his legislative term.23 The complexity of the Rose case
arises from the fact that the plaintiff was a public official at
the time of the initial libels, and a nonofficial public figure at
the time of the subsequent libels.24 The Minnesota court held
that only the Times standard was applicable in this situation
on the ground that the application of two standards of lia-
bility to the same case "would tax the ingenuity of the trial
court and hopelessly confuse the jury."25 The court then found
that the district court's jury instructions were inadequate in
light of the Times standard,2 and consequently remanded for
a new trial.
21. The libel in Butts arose out of an article in The Saturday
Evening Post which accused Butts, who was then the athletic director at
the University of Georgia, of "fixing" a football game between the
University of Georgia and the University of Alabama. The Post had
received its information from one George Burnett, who had accidentally
overheard a telephone conversation between Butts and the Alabama
coach. Butts contended that the conversation concerned only general
football talk which would be of no value to an opposing coach. In
finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy his standard of "highly
unreasonable conduct," Harlan noted that the Butts story, unlike the
news dispatch in Walker, did not require immediate dissemination and
the publishers consequently had time to make an adequate investiga-
tion. However, the Post apparently did not take even elementary in-
vestigatory precautions. For example, the Post knew that informer
Burnett was on probation for bad check charges, and yet accepted his
affidavit without independent verification. Moreover, the Post writer
assigned to the article was not a football expert and no attempt was
made to get expert advice on the story. Finally, Harlan noted that the
Post was attempting to increase circulation by a policy of "sophisti-
cated muckraking" and was therefore under pressure to print an expose.
Justice Harlan's victory in Butts was made possible by Chief Jus-
tice Warren's concurrence in his result. The Chief Justice, however,
concurred only on the ground that the evidence satisfied the actual
malice requirements of the Times rule and, consequently, a majority of
the Court did not join in Harlan's new public figure standard. How-
ever, since Harlan did write the plurality opinion, his public figure
standard is entitled to consideration.
22. 154 N.W.2d at 419.
23. Id. at 426.
24. See notes 1-3 supra.
25. 154 N.W.2d at 430.
26. The lower court's jury instructions were in error in two re-
spects. First, the court limited the defendant's conditional privilege of
comment to those times that the plaintiff was either a candidate for
election or an elected member of the legislature. Next, although the
lower court correctly instructed that the plaintiff must prove actual
malice to recover punitive damages or to recover damages for the
19681
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It is clear that the Times rule must be applied to the plaintiff
for the period that he was a state representative. 27 In choosing
the standard applicable to the plaintiff for the period that he was
a nonofficial public figure, the Minnesota court was faced with
three alternatives. It could have applied Harlan's public figure
standard and required a separate trial for the libels occurring
during this period. However, this would seem to be an unrea-
sonable choice in view of the expense and length of a typical
libel suit.28 Thus the court was limited to either a blanket appli-
cation of the Times rule or to the application of two sets of
jury instructions covering the two periods of time. The court
chose the former alternative 29 on the basis that the latter
would be impractical. Unfortunately, the court did not attempt
to further justify its choice and it is therefore suggested that
the basic question still remains: Is the difficulty of applying
two standards of liability to the same case sufficient to justify
the rejection of Harlan's public figure standard? In order to
answer this question, it will be helpful to examine the con-
period that he was a public official, it incorrectly instructed that evi-
dence of personal ill will, the exaggerated nature of the publication, and
other such factors could be considered oy the jury in passing on the
question of malice. 154 N.W.2d at 421-22. As the court noted, such
instructions do not comply with the Times standard of actual malice.
Id. at 427-28. See also St. Amant v. Thompson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S.
April 29, 1968), for the Supreme Court's most recent elaboration on
the Times standard of actual malice. Since the court refused to apply
Harlan's public figure standard, it made no attempt to decide to what
degree "highly unreasonable conduct" is less than "reckless disregard
of the truth," or to decide whether the evidence in the Rose case would
satisfy Harlan's standard for public figures. 154 N.W.2d at 430 n.70.
27. There is also an excellent argument for the extension of the
Times rule into the period that the plaintiff was a candidate for public
office, since uninhibited discussion on the fitness of one for public office
is obviously essential to the proper functioning of the democratic proc-
ess. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); see gen-
erally Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLmm.
L. REV. 875 (1949). Pre-Times law in Minnesota did, in fact, extend
the defense of conditional privilege of comment into the periods that
one was either a candidate for election or a public official. See, e.g.,
Hammerstein v. Reiing, 262 Minn. 200, 207, 115 N.W.2d 259, 264, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1,
9, 277 N.W. 264, 268 (1938). Thus the trial court in Rose correctly
instructed that the plaintiff must prove actual malice to recover damages
for the libels occurring during the periods that he was a candidate for
election or an elected state representative. This instruction was er-
roneous only in that it failed to comply with the Times definition of
actual malice. See note 26 supra.
28. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 167 (1967)
(Warren, C.J., concurring); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 335 U.S. 374, 411 (1967)
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
29. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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siderations which prompted Harlan to derive a new standard
for public figures, and to determine whether those considera-
tions are applicable to a public figure who was also a public
official at a different time during the course of the libel.
Harlan distinguished the libel of a public official from the
libel of a public figure on several grounds.30 First, he noted
that a libel suit brought by a public official could be analogized
to a prosecution for seditious libel. Clearly the repression of
political dissent brought about by seditious libel actions is con-
trary to the basic principles of a democratic society,31 and con-
sequently this analogy provides a valid justification for the
limited scope of actionable libel when the libel is directed
against public officials. 32 On the other hand, the absence of the
evils of seditious libel actions in a suit brought by a public
figure was one of the factors which prompted Harlan to derive a
less strict standard for those actions. Harlan did not reach
the question of which standard should be applied to a per-
son who was both a public official and a nonofficial public
figure at different times during the libel. However, it would
seem that such a person would usually evoke comments of a
political nature even while only a nonofficial public figure, and
consequently should be accorded only that protection against
libelous statements granted to public officials.3 3  Certainly this
30. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967).
31. See, e.g., Brant, Seditious Libel: Myth and Reality, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1 (1964); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning" of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 205.
32. This analogy was drawn in the Times case as one basis for
the Times rule. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-78
(1964).
33. Another possible means of eliminating the evils of seditious
libel actions would be to focus on the content of the speech rather than
on the status of the plaintiff. Under this approach, politically orien-
ted speech would be accorded the higher protection of the Times rule,
while nonpolitical speech would be granted only that protection afforded
by Harlan's "highly unreasonable" standard. Cf. Note, Defamation of
the Public Official, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 614, 629 n.80 (1966).
However, such an approach would seem to be precluded by the case
of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1966), where the Court, in extending
the Times rule into right to privacy actions, expressly stated that "[t]he
guarantees for speech and press are not the pressure of political ex-
pression or comment on public affairs .... " Id. at 388.
Moreover, a set of standards based entirely on the rather tenuous
distinction between political and nonpolitical speech would probably
fail to provide the press with workable guidelines and, consequently,
such an approach could very well defeat the purposes of the Times
rule by inhibiting rather than encouraging vigorous comment on public
issues and public men. Cf. Comment, 32 ALBANY L. REv. 207, 212 (1967).
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distinction is applicable to the Rose case. The accusation that
one is a Communist collaborator is political in nature and
clearly distinguishable from the accusation in the Butts34 case
that one has fixed a football game, or the accusation in the
Walker35 case that one was an active participant in a race riot.
Thus the libel action brought by Rose more closely resembles a
prosecution for seditious libel than the actions brought by either
Butts or Walker, and the application of the Times rule to this
case is therefore justifiable.
Harlan also noted that a public official and a public figure
are distinguishable when the former is accorded a special privi-
lege of comment protecting his speech against libel actions, such
as the privilege of comment enjoyed by federal and state legis-
lators while on the floors of their respective legislatures.3 6 The
Times rule has been justified as giving to the public a privilege
of comment commensurate with that accorded these public offi-
cials.37 On the other hand, the absence of any special privileges
of comment for public figures was one of the factors which led
Harlan to his conclusion that a less strict standard should be
applied to libel actions brought by public figures. In order to
decide which standard should be applied to a plaintiff who
was both a public official and a nonofficial public figure, it is
necessary to consider the overall effects of the special privilege
of comment enjoyed by the plaintiff while a public official. If
the plaintiff were a nonofficial public figure during the initial
parts of the libel, he could use his later obtained privilege as a
public official to rebut the accusations without fear of a libel
suit. If he were a public official during the initial parts of the
libel, he could immediately defend himself against both present
and anticipated accusations. Thus, the special privilege of com-
ment accorded the plaintiff while a public official will probably
34. See note 21 supra.
35. See note 20 supra.
36. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; Mmn . CONsT. art. 4, § 8.
Similar privileges of comment are accorded to certain federal officers
in the executive branch. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). State law
also provides immunity to certain state officers. See generally W.
PROSSR, THE LAW OF TORTS § 109 (3d ed. 1964).
37. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-83
(1963); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). This consideration
is only one of several justifications for the Times rule, see, e.g., note 32
supra and accompanying text, and consequently the Times rule is not
necessarily limited to those public officials who do enjoy such a privi-
lege of comment. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 388' U.S. 75, 85 n.10 (1966). Nor
does a public figure's lack of a special privilege of comment necessarily
preclude application of the Times rule to him. Pauling v. Globe-
Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966).
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have effects beyond the period that he actually was a public offi-
cial; consequently such a plaintiff more closely resembles a
public official than a public figure. This distinction is clearly
applicable to the Rose case since Dr. Rose enjoyed a legislative
immunity from libel suits while a state representative." Al-
though he did not take full advantage of this immunity, 9 it was
nevertheless available to him, and it is therefore suggested that
the application of the Times rule to his libel suit is justifiable.
The Rose situation will undoubtedly develop frequently
since those who hold public office will often have been public
figures previously, and those who have completed their term in
office will often be public figures thereafter. Because of the in-
herent difficulty of applying two different standards of liability
in the same case, the United States Supreme Court should de-
cide what standard is applicable to a plaintiff who has been
both a public official and a public figure during the course of
the libel. In the meantime, lower federal and state courts will
have to carefully examine the Walker and Butts cases in order to
determine whether such a plaintiff more closely resembles a pub-
lic official or a public figure. In the Rose situation, this exami-
nation indicates that the status of a public official should be
accorded to plaintiff Rose. It is therefore submitted that the
Minnesota court was correct in applying the Times standard in
the Rose decision.
38. See lnI. CoNsT. art. 4, § 8.
39. While a state representative, Dr. Rose did make a speech on
the House floor denying the charges that had been leveled against him.
Although he did warn in general terms against "dangerous revolution-
aries" who "parade falsely under the name of 'Conservatives,'" he
apparently made no reference to Miss Koch or to her publishing com-
pany. 154 N.W.2d at 418 n.15.
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